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In his April 15, 2011, signing statement President Barack Obama implied that, as
president, he may suspend laws, or portions of laws, and that he is not controlled by statutory
language that interferes with his ability to receive advice from White House aides or other
executive branch officials. This article analyzes the claim that presidents have the prerogative to
wall themselves and their aides off from statutory direction and controls, and concludes that
there is no constitutional or legal basis for such an understanding of the executive power.
On April 15, 2011, President Barack Obama issued a controversial signing state-
ment that effectively nullified a provision of a bill he had signed into law. Specifically, the
president “abrogated” section 2262 of the budget compromise law, which prohibited
using appropriations for the salaries and expenses of the czars of energy, health reform,
auto recovery, and urban affairs (Obama 2011). The defunding provision was part of a
larger effort by Congress to prevent the increased centralization and control of public
policy by White House aides who are not confirmed by the Senate.
The moniker “czar” is the shorthand term used by the media, politicians, and
scholars to describe certain officials who are appointed by the president to provide
advice, coordinate policies among multiple departments and agencies, and even to
make important personnel and spending decisions. Lacking senatorial confirmation and
even prohibited many times from testifying, czars are a controversial feature of the
executive branch. Given the substantial number of czars in the Obama White House,
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Republican members of the House had been trying to pass similar anti-czar measures
for nearly two years before successfully adding the anti-czar provision to the budget
bill (Fabian 2009; O’Brien 2011; Zimmermann 2009). Senate Republicans had also
sought information about 18 positions in the Obama administration that they consid-
ered czars and asked that the president “refrain from creating any new czar-type posts”
(Lerer 2009).
Obama justified his plan to set aside the anti-czar provision by stating that the
“President has well-established authority to supervise and oversee the executive branch,
and to obtain advice in furtherance of this supervisory authority.” Continuing, Obama
noted that he has “the prerogative to obtain advice” in fulfilling his “constitutional
responsibilities” from any official or employee within the executive branch or the White
House. “Legislative efforts that significantly impede the President’s ability to exercise his
supervisory and coordinating authorities or to obtain the views of the appropriate senior
advisers,” he claimed, “violate the separation of powers by undermining the President’s
ability to exercise his constitutional responsibilities and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.” The result being that Obama would “construe section 2262 not to
abrogate these Presidential prerogatives” (Obama 2011).
Obama’s signing statement set off a variety of criticisms, most notably from
Representative Steve Scalise (R-LA), author of the anti-czars provision of the budget
bill: “The President does not have the option of choosing which laws he will follow
and which he will ignore.” He continued: “The United States is not a kingdom run by
a political dictator, and President Obama needs to quickly reverse course and abide by
the law eliminating the czars that were part of the budget resolution agreed to be
Speaker Boehner, Senator Reid, and President Obama himself” (Scalise 2011). Some
Democratic lawmakers, however, countered by saying that section 2262 was “an
intrusive micromanagement of the president’s White House staff via appropriations”
(Bravender 2011).
The controversy over the president’s signing statement raises a significant consti-
tutional question: is there a constitutional or any legal basis for presidents to claim that
they have the authority to shield themselves and their aides from statutory direction
and controls? President Obama believes so, and he went so far as to invoke the concept
of prerogative power as a defense of his action to void a provision of a bill he had signed
into law.
To answer the constitutional question raised by Obama’s action, this article
describes the concept of prerogative power and provides an assessment of whether
presidents possess such authority. It poses the question of whether presidents have the
ability to set aside laws after they have signed them. It further analyzes the claimed
constitutional bases for presidents to unilaterally control the creation, modification, and
continuation of offices within the White House, Executive Office of the President (EOP),
and the executive branch more generally. To do so requires an overview and assessment of
the current legal framework used to create and shape the offices and positions within the
White House and EOP. The article ends with an evaluation of the extent and limits of
Congress’s authority to provide statutory direction and controls on White House struc-
ture and personnel.
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Prerogative Power and the Presidency
The U.S. framers drew significantly from various British constitutional customs in
developing a new governing structure. They were aware that under the British system the
monarch had possessed the prerogative power—the right to act outside the law when he
deemed it in the public interest to do so. That power was “inherent in the crown” and
permitted the “king to do things which no one else could do, and his power to do them
in a way in which no one else could do them” (Adams 1921, 78; Todd 1867, vol. 1, 244).
The king could not only exercise authority established in law but even act against any
legal restrictions to carry out the public good (Locke 1980). Among other things the
prerogative power provided the English monarch with the authority to initiate wars, raise
armies, make treaties, create offices, appropriate money, and set aside statutes (Adams
1921; Todd 1867). Even by the dawn of the American Revolution the prerogative power
of the king remained strong. As William Blackstone wrote, “[b]y the word prerogative
we usually understand that special pre-eminence, which the king hath, over and above all
other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal
dignity” (Blackstone 1765, vol. 1, 232).
Upon their declaration of independence from England, the American colonies
rejected a model of the executive that would include prerogative power. Instead, the new
nation established a central government without an independent executive. At the state
level, the powers of governors were greatly limited with the overwhelming authority
going to the legislative branch (Kruman 1997). Because of the failings of the Continental
Congress to effectively manage the war without resorting to boards and eventually
executive officers, the framers realized that they needed a different governing structure.
However, even during the Constitutional Convention the framers refused to go back
tomonarchialdominationas they insteadrestrictedandcheckedexecutivepower. Inmatters
of war, spending, and administration, all of the powers that once belonged to the English
king alone were either taken from the executive or checked by the legislative branch.
Delegate James Wilson, a proponent of a strong presidency, noted that he “did not consider
the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers.
Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace
&c.” (Farrand 1966, vol. 1, 65-66). As a result, the framers placed any vestiges of a king’s
prerogative power squarely within the Constitution. For example, Congress possesses the
ability to declare war and only in matters of defensive action or cases of rebellion (a situation
Abraham Lincoln faced at the beginning of the Civil War) could a president act alone. A
regular functioning prerogative power that remains outside the Constitution is impossible
to square with a republican government based on limited and balanced powers.
In his signing statement Obama implied that as president, he may suspend laws, or
portions of laws, and that he is not controlled by statutory language that interferes with
his ability to receive advice from White House aides or other executive branch officials.
Obama is not the first president to either expressly claim or imply that he may dispense
with a law by the way of a signing statement (Kelley 2006, 77). However, regardless of
who or when the practice began, such a contention poses a serious breach of the system
of balanced and checked powers. Professor Westel Woodbury Willoughby did well to
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explain the extent of the problem with presidents claiming that they can unilaterally
ignore law: “The President is an agent selected by the people, for the express purpose of
seeing that the laws of the land are executed. If, upon his own judgment, he refuse to
execute a law and thus nullifies it, he is arrogating to himself controlling legislative
functions, and laws have but an advisory, recommendatory character, depending for
power upon the good-will of the President” (1910, vol. 2, 1308).
Consider again theBritishprecedentsofwhichtheU.S. founderswere intenselyaware.
The British Parliament continually feared monarchs setting aside laws through the use of
a part of their prerogative power (Fatovic 2009, 42; May 1994, 869-72). Eventually the
Glorious Revolution produced the English Bill of Rights of 1689 that forbade the
suspension of the laws without the consent of Parliament (Berman 2006, 226; May 1994,
872). By the time of the American Revolution, Blackstone could write, “It is true it was
formerly held, that the king might in many cases dispense with penal statutes: but now by
statute . . . it is declared, that the suspending or dispensing with laws by regal authority,
without consent of parliament, is illegal” (Blackstone 1765, vol. 1, 178-79). The framers,
being well aware of this history, chose to write into the Constitution a similar limitation
onexecutivepower: thepresident “shall takeCare that theLawsbe faithfully executed” (U.S.
Constitution, art. I, sec. 3; May 1994, 872; see also Adler, 2006).
The federal courts have continually rejected claims that presidents may ignore laws.
In 1806, a circuit court said, “The President of the United States cannot control the statute,
nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he authorize a person to do what the law
forbids. If he could, it would render the executive of the laws dependent on his will and
pleasure; which is a doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet with any supporters
in our government” (United States v. Smith 1806, 1230). The Supreme Court has, as well,
placed a similar interpretation on the Take Care Clause. In 1838, the Court declared, “To
contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed,
implied a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and
entirely inadmissible” (Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes 1838, 613). In 1882, the Court
reiterated, “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law
may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it” (United States v. Lee
1882, 220). Finally, in 1952, the Court held, “In the framework of our Constitution, the
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to
be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the
Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President
is to execute” (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 1952, 587).
The Presentment Clause provides additional textual support for the understanding
that laws are only made by Congress passing a bill and the president signing it into law.
The framers did not give to the president the power to unilaterally change a law after he
provided his signature. As Professor Willoughby explained, “President might at his
discretion use a veto, but this was the entire extent to which he was allowed to go in the
exercise of a check upon the legislation. It was expressly provided that if, after his veto,
two-thirds of the legislature should again demand that the measure become a law, it
822 | PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2011
should thus be, notwithstanding the objection of the Chief Executive. Surely there is here
left no further constitutional right on the part of the President to hinder the operation of
a law” (Willoughby 1910, vol. 2, 1308). Others have come to the same conclusion. “Once
a bill has passed through all the constitutional forms of enactment and has become a law,
perhaps even over a presidential veto grounded on constitutional objections,” legal
scholar Eugene Gressman noted “the President has no option under article II but to
enforce the measure faithfully” (1986, 382). Similarly Christopher N. Mayer, author of a
comprehensive study on the ability of presidents to ignore laws, stated, “The Constitu-
tion gives to Congress the power to suspend the laws; if a statute is to be abrogated, the
same procedure must be followed that led to its enactment” (1994, 1011). No president
can sign a bill into law and then subsequently suspend it. That type of prerogative power
was not placed in the Constitution.
Obama also questions Congress’s authority to eliminate offices that provide advice
to the president. The implication of his view is that ultimately the chief executive is the
source for an office’s existence. That is, if Congress cannot do away with certain govern-
mental structure, then the president takes command. Such a claim could certainly have
been made by an English monarch. Under the British system, the king had the ability to
create offices, appoint his special favorites, and even remove them for any reason (Burgess
1891, vol. 2, 2006). Alexander Hamilton explained, the “king of Great Britain is
emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices,
but can create offices” (Wright 2002, 449). The framers rejected that model and settled
on a system that protects the power of the legislative branch to create offices of the
executive branch. Article II of the Constitution provides that the president “shall nomi-
nate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers
of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and
which shall be established by law” (U.S. Constitution, art. II, sec. 2). In addressing the
differences between the British monarch and the president, even a strong presidency
advocate such as Hamilton noted that there “is evidently a great inferiority in the power
of the President, in [creating offices], to that of the British king” (Wright 2002, 449).
Subsequent interpretations of legislative authority confirmed the framers’ goal of
ensuring that Congress can establish and guide the direction of government offices.
Speaking during the First Congress, James Madison declared that the “Legislature creates
the office, defines the powers, limits its duration, and annexes a compensation” (1 Annals
of Congress 604 [June 22, 1789]). In 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall explained in
McCulloch v. Maryland that Congress has the ability through the Necessary and Proper
Clause to create government structures which “shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution” its express powers (1819, 316).
Four years later Marshall, sitting as a circuit court judge, again supported Con-
gress’s ability to create offices, but this time based its authority on the Appointments
Clause. As he explained, the most proper interpretation of that clause, which “accords
best with the general spirit of the constitution,” places the creation of offices with
Congress. Marshall said clear textual direction is provided by the second section of article
II which “directs that all offices of the United States shall be established by law.” That
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language leaves no other interpretation than Congress, not the president, can create
offices. Finally, he noted that “the practice of the government has been for the legislature”
to organize a method for executing policy by authorizing the president “to employ such
persons as he might think proper, for the performance of particular services” (United States
v. Maurice 1823, 1214).
On at least three occasions, U.S. attorneys general have supported Marshall’s
judgment. In 1849, Attorney General Reverdy Johnson issued an opinion instructing
the Interior Secretary Thomas Ewing, Sr., that he did not have the authority to appoint
a building superintendent because Congress acted to abolish the office. Johnson stated
that President Zachary Taylor concurred in his assessment (5 Op. Att’y Gen. 88 [April
19, 1849]). Twelve years later Attorney General Edward Bates said that the president
has no authority to create a bureau in the War Department without Congress’s
approval. The president and Congress “may exercise the powers conferred by the
Constitution in the appropriate sphere,” Bates reasoned, “but neither may assume
the powers which belong to the other” (10 Op. Att’y Gen. 11, 15 [March 5, 1861]).
Referencing Chief Justice Marshall’s own assessment, Attorney General Augustus Hill
Garland said in an 1885 opinion that “An officer of the United States presupposes an
office duly created by law; and the offices to which the President is authorized under
the Constitution to appoint are only those established or recognized by the Constitu-
tion or by act of Congress.” He even declared that since “the president cannot create
an office, I am of opinion he cannot appoint honorary commissioners” as well (18 Op.
Att’y Gen. 171 [May 6, 1885]).
Even in an otherwise pro-presidential power decision of Myers v. United States, Chief
Justice William Howard Taft, a former president himself, stated, “To Congress under its
legislative power is given the establishment of offices, the determination of their functions
and jurisdiction, the prescribing of reasonable and relevant qualifications and rules of
eligibility of appointees, and the fixing of the term for which they are to be appointed, and
their compensation—all except as otherwise provided by the Constitution” (1926, 129).
Constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin reinforced Taft’s words when he reasoned that
the “Constitution by the ‘necessary and proper’ clause assigns the power to create offices to
Congress.” Any appointment, he argued, would therefore have to be “to an existing office,
one that owes its existence to an act of Congress” (Corwin 1957, 70 [italics in original]).
More recently, President Ronald Reagan’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the
Department of Justice issued a legal memorandum in 1985 that addressed whether a
president could create new executive branch structures independent of Congress. The
OLC concluded that “the President lacks constitutional and statutory authority to do so.”
It said that the text of the Appointments Clause and “the historic practice of the
Executive and Legislative Branches suggests strongly that offices of the United States
must be created by Congress” (9 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 76). The traditional division
of responsibilities, the OLC argued, has been for Congress to provide for the establish-
ment of executive branch structure by statute and presidents or department and agency
heads to select individuals to fill various positions (9 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, 77-78).
The OLC highlighted that presidents have acquiesced to such practice by continually
seeking “reorganization legislation in order to restructure or consolidate agencies within
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the Executive Branch.” Finally, the OLC touched on the statutory language that provides
that a president “shall designate” agency or department officers to administer a new
program. It argued that unless Congress provides additional authority a president cannot
create new offices in such cases. “On its face,” the OLC concluded, the “shall designate”
language contemplates that the assistance will come from an existing department or
agency (9 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, 78).
In appropriating funds for the salaries and resources of new government structures,
has Congress thus provided its consent to presidents to create offices on their own?
Constitutionally, that is a dubious position. Presidents have available to them discre-
tionary accounts that add up to millions of dollars, and they have often used such funds
to create new offices without seeking the approval of Congress. This evading of the
legislative appropriations process is a direct assault on the duties and responsibilities of
lawmakers. The House of Representatives and the Senate have established a two-step
process for the creation and funding of new executive branch structures. Agencies are
authorized by law and later funded by law. For example, Congress set up the Department
of Homeland Security detailing its leadership personnel and functions along with its
subunits and agencies in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (116 Stat. 2135). The
funding for the new department, however, came later through an independent appro-
priations law.
The rules of the House and Senate specifically require this two-step authorization-
appropriations process with clear distinctions between each part (House Rule XXI, clause
2; House Rule XXII, clause 5; and Senate Rule XVI). During the U.S. war in Vietnam,
Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration argued that Congress had authorized the military
conflict by appropriating funds. In 1970, various academic experts challenged that theory
in Beck v. Laird, a U.S. district court case in the Eastern District of New York, by
reasoning that policy cannot be set through the legislative appropriations process (Fisher
1979, 83). The court concluded, however, that if Congress funded the war, then it had
been legislatively authorized. Many federal judges backed away from the view that
appropriations can mean legislative endorsement of war policy (Fisher 1979, 84). Later,
through section eight of the War Powers Resolution (1973), Congress expressly stated
that appropriations do not authorize a war unless there is language in a spending bill that
clearly provides legislative approval for a president’s military actions (87 Stat. 555; Fisher
1979, 84). The assumption that Congress has somehow authorized unilateral executive
action through appropriations is false.
The framers adopted a constitutional framework that rejected the continuation of
the British monarch’s form of prerogative powers in the presidency. The authority to
suspend laws or to create and control offices without statutory direction would not be
vested in the president. Congress would be the primary lawmaking institution of the
federal government which meant that it could create, modify, and eliminate executive
branch—and even White House—structure. Thus, the president cannot properly make
the claim of a special prerogative to wall himself off from statutory direction relating to
the administration of the law. Making such a claim is an attempt to cut the president
loose from constitutional and statutory restrictions. There exists no inherent presidential
power to break the safeguards that promote government accountability.
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White House Authorization Act of 1978
Having dispensed with the notion that presidents have a constitutional basis to
ignore or otherwise unilaterally free themselves from statutory direction, we turn to the
legal framework that controls the White House and EOP staff. Is there any presidential
autonomy built into the existing advisory structure that would somehow prevent Con-
gress from modifying it? The current statutory language that provides the basis for the
White House and EOP structure and staff can be found in Title 3 of the U.S. Code. The
title can trace its origins to the Reorganization Act of 1939 (53 Stat. 561) and has
seen one major overhaul. Leading up to the 1939 Reorganization Act, the chair of the
President’s Committee on Administrative Management, Louis Brownlow, famously
quipped that the “president needs help” (1937, 5). Franklin D. Roosevelt looked to
Congress, not inward, to provide the administrative structure he required.
The only significant modification to Title 3 occurred in 1978 when Congress passed
the White House Authorization Act in an attempt to limit the number of personnel in
the White House Office, the Vice President’s Office, the president’s domestic policy staff,
and the Office of Administration (92 Stat. 2445). The legislative history and debate over
the White House Authorization Act date to the early 1970s when Representative John
Dingell (D-MI) objected to the practice of the White House receiving appropriations for
personnel that Congress had not authorized. Over the course of several Congresses,
various pieces of legislation to resolve this issue failed (Hart 1995, 172-73). By 1977
Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Representative Herbert E. Harris II (D-VA),
and Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ) finally secured passage of a bill to overhaul Title
3. In her introductory remarks on the bill in 1978, Representative Schroeder explained
the concerns she had over an unaccountable White House:
The central issue before us, in this regard, is whether the Congress should acquiesce in, and
by implication, approve of, having Presidents who are unaccountable for their funds and
their close staff. To oppose placing limitations upon the President’s staff, however, strongly
we might wish to give him a blank check to get his jobs done, is to ignore the duty and
power of Congress under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution to provide from
time to time positions in the executive branch. This provision is one of the tensions which
the Founders of our Nation put into the structure of the Federal Government. It must not
be compromised by our inaction. It must be conscientiously exercised. (124 Cong. Rec.
8632)
Schroeder correctly stated the need of Congress to provide effective oversight and control
over the executive branch. There is no separation of powers concern with lawmakers
placing limitations on the president’s staff, since Congress must authorize their creation
in the first place.
Similarly, Representative Harris said that the “fundamental point here is to make
sure power is in the hands of accountable people: the Cabinet.” He argued that “executive
advisers and special assistants to the President have their proper advisory role” and
nothing more. Congress did not, Harris argued, “vest in them unlimited powers.” What
concerned him even more is the fact that White House aides are “unelected” and
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sometimes made “inaccessible” to Congress presumably through executive privilege
claims. “Quite simply,” Harris declared, “our Government should not be run by, and our
President should not depend on a ‘palace guard.’ ” Finally, he warned that “centralized
power in the hands of a few anonymous individuals is contrary to a democracy” (124
Cong. Rec. 8633-34).
Although both Schroeder and Harris provided a useful overview of the constitu-
tional and governing concerns with White House aides, the final legislative product
greatly increased the number of authorized personnel in the White House. There would
be no limit to the size of the White House Office but instead the legislation only
restricted the number of executive level II (25) and III (25) positions along with some
of the supergrade staff (50 positions at a GS-18 and “such number of other employees as”
the president “may determine . . . not to exceed the” GS-16 rate of pay). The bill even
included a provision that authorized the president “to procure for the White House
Office . . . temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants” not to exceed
the executive II pay level so even the initial limits on such positions were greatly
weakened. The word “temporary” took on a subjective meaning under the bill as later on
the provision reads: “temporary services of any expert or consultant . . . may be procured
for a period in excess of one year if the President determines such procurement is
necessary.” In addition, the bill authorized the staffing of the domestic policy and office
of administration personnel within the White House Office: 11 employees not to exceed
executive III pay; 23 employees not to exceed the GS-18 level; such “other employees as
[the president] may determine to be appropriate” not to exceed the GS-16 level; and
another section permitting the employment of “temporary or intermittent services and
consultants” not to exceed the GS-18 level (124 Cong. Rec. 8629-30).
Aside from the personnel provisions, the bill included a section authorizing a
million dollars for “unanticipated needs for the furtherance of the national interest,
security, or defense, including personnel needs.” That section had a reporting require-
ment for each fiscal year and limited the individual pay provided to not exceed executive
level II. Another section provided the president with the authority to detail executive
department and agency employees to the White House. Finally, the bill required a
general report on the number of executive branch employees detailed to the White House
for more than 180 days along with the number of experts and consultants hired and the
total number of days employed along with the costs for their services (aggregate and by
office). Only later would a general reporting requirement for full-time White House staff
be included in the legislation (124 Cong. Rec. 8630-31).
Despite the strong endorsement from Schroeder and Harris there was considerable
opposition to the bill that centered on the open-ended authorization of presidential
personnel along with the lack of true accountability and reporting requirements. Rep-
resentative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) sought to offer an amendment that would have
required that presidents, one year after assuming office, submit to Congress a new
authorization request for their staff. He argued that lawmakers were “making a serious
mistake if we pass legislation that sets a precedent—for future measures containing
similar authorizations that are not annual or biannual or even under some 5-year concept
of economic planning but are in themselves self-sustaining.” Gilman wanted to offer a
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second amendment that required a more detailed report from the president on White
House personnel explaining that he sought “to insure the integrity of the oversight
function” of Congress “by having available to us by law on a timely basis the information
necessary to carry out our duty.” At that time neither measure could be acted upon as the
Democratic House majority brought the bill up under a closed rule which prevented
amendments from being offered (124 Cong. Rec. 8635).
Other concerns over the legislation from lawmakers such as Representative Henry
Hyde (R-IL) centered on the expansion of presidential staff and increasing the funds
available to presidents for “unanticipated needs.” Hyde declared that “the bill authorizes
a number of unprecedented features which ought to concern those recent converts to the
idea of executive accountability.” He specifically questioned the need for twice as many
White House Office staff as Congress had previously authorized. In addition, Hyde
decried the absence of checks on presidents who can “hire an unlimited number of
consultants and ‘detailees’ from other agencies” under the legislation. Finally, Hyde
wondered what was meant by the $1 million appropriation for presidents to spend at
their discretion “to meet unanticipated needs for the furtherance of the national interest,
security or defense.” He asked is this “for petty cash” or “pocket money?” “We are talking
about 1 million tax dollars,” he continued “and we deserve to know a few facts, at the very
least” (124 Cong. Rec. 8636).
The House eventually voted on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill
without amendment, but it failed to secure the two-thirds vote (124 Cong. Rec. 8647).
This outcome resulted in Representative Gilman being able to offer his amendment
requiring a stronger reporting measure, which stipulated that presidents provide the
number of full-time White House staff in the aggregate and broken down by office.
Representative James Pickle (D-TX) moved to strengthen Gilman’s amendment by
adding a requirement that the president also report the names of each person working
full-time or detailed to the White House, the amount appropriated for their salary, and
general title along with a job description (124 Cong. Rec. 10121). The House agreed to
both measures (124 Cong. Rec. 10122). Representative Gilman also offered a sunset
amendment to provide for authorization “beginning October 1, 1978, and to each of the
following 4 fiscal years” (124 Cong. Rec. 10122). Representative Schroeder rose in
opposition but only because she argued that a sunset provision would also eliminate the
strengthened reporting requirements, which would mean “we would go back prior to the
law and be where we are now” (124 Cong. Rec. 10123). After several other lawmakers
also spoke against the amendment the House voted to reject it by a 171 to 232 margin
with 31 members not voting (124 Cong. Rec. 10124). The House went on to pass the bill
by a 265 to 134 vote with 35 lawmakers not voting (124 Cong. Rec. 10126).
In the Senate, William V. Roth Jr. (R-DE) offered, and the chamber passed, a
similar sunset amendment to Representative Gilman’s, but this one provided authoriza-
tion until September 30, 1983 (124 Cong. Rec. 20904). During the conference
committee that had been established to resolve disagreements over the bill, Roth’s
amendment was stripped. In the conference report, the conferees justified their action by
arguing that “a distinction should be made between general sunset provisions which
require reauthorization of programs, and the ‘sunset’ provision in this amendment which
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would require reenactment of budget authority for the President to hire staff” (U.S.
Senate 1978, 4). That explanation alone is strange and confusing, as no additional
comments were made as to why such a distinction should matter. Nothing in the
Constitution or existing law prevents Congress from requiring presidents to request
annual authorization for their staff. If lawmakers really wanted to hold the president
accountable, they should have required the chief executive to justify White House
personnel, or at least the addition of new aides, from time to time.
Even the House majority was not convinced that the law established substantial
controls on the president. The House report on the bill stated that the proposed law
“allows the Congress limited oversight” (U.S. House 1978, 8). Members of the Senate—
both Democratic and Republican—agreed. Senator Harry F. Byrd (VA), an independent
Democrat opposed to the bill, questioned Congress’s actions for not setting a limit on
White House expenditures. After much back and forth, Democratic Senator Lawton
Chiles (FL), a supporter of the legislation, admitted that there “is no direct control here
so far as a total figure is concerned” (124 Cong. Rec. 20898). Republican Senator Bob
Dole (KS) read the bill’s authorization provision which provides “such sums as may be
necessary” and quipped: “Frankly, it does not sound like Congress is exerting much
control” (124 Cong. Rec. 20901).
The conference committee stripped away even more checks from the bill. Aside
from removing the sunset provision, the conferees eliminated the annual reporting
requirement that mandated the president provide to Congress the name, job title, job
description, and salary of every individual employed in the White House. The conferees
explained that such a reporting requirement “is contrary to Government-wide rules,
developed to conform with both the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act,
that are tailored to provide for protection of the privacy of individuals involved.” In
addition, the conferees modified another reporting requirement for federal workers
detailed to the White House. Instead of requiring the number and names of all detailed
federal workers the conferees exempted individuals who had worked at the White House
for less than 30 days. Here the conferees said that they had “received assurance from the
[Carter] administration that, as in the past, this information will be provided to the
Congress upon request” (U.S. Senate 1978, 3).
There are several problems with the conferees’ actions. Presidential aides are public
officials and employees who should be subject to the same democratic controls as any
other federal worker. Many states make available the salaries of their public employees,
including college and university personnel. Executive office staff should receive the same
level of scrutiny. At the very least, Congress could have excluded each employee’s name
but required the listing of job title, job description, and salary. In the end, it is Congress
that has the constitutional responsibility to appropriate, and that authority includes
specifying the salary of presidential aides. All appropriations, even those going to the
president, should be subject to congressional oversight and scrutiny. Another issue
centers on the number of aides presidents may appoint. Although lawmakers provided a
set limit of 100 White House aides at various levels of pay, another provision in the law
permitted a president to appoint “such number of other employees as he may determine
to be appropriate” (92 Stat. 2445). This provision blew a hole in the idea that Congress
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would actually succeed in holding presidents to account by placing limits or any kind of
supervisory controls upon their staff. Finally, comity is always the best way to manage
interbranch relations than by discord and turmoil. However, just because Congress
receives assurances from one administration that it will freely disclose information does
not mean all others will do the same.
In his assessment, scholar John Hart explained that the White House Authorization
Act “has turned out to be little more than a congressional housekeeping measure that
temporarily restored the importance of a low-prestige authorizing committee.” He added
that the law “has had negligible effect on the organization, management, and account-
ability of the presidential staff” (Hart 1995, 182). Certainly it has been a rather ineffec-
tive law for providing vital information to Congress in carrying out any kind of
meaningful and effective oversight of the White House.
Yet just because a law is ineffective does not mean that Congress somehow has
chosen to provide the presidency complete autonomy in managing the White House. The
fact is that Congress is free to again either amend or overhaul Title 3. Nothing in the
Constitution creates a built-in autonomy for presidents in this area. Creating, changing,
and eliminating government structure are core legislative functions. However, repeatedly
presidents have argued they have the independent authority to control and reshape the
White House and executive branch structure. What is the source of such authority? Not
the Constitution. Congress has provided presidents with the power to reorganize the
executive branch, including the White House, under statutory authority dating back to
the early 1930s (47 Stat. 413 [1932]; 47 Stat. 14517 [1933]; 48 Stat. 16 [1933]). But
such authority is based on a delegation of legislative power, not a constitutional function
of the presidency. As a result, there can be no executive prerogative or separation of
powers claim to autonomy regarding a function that is legislative in nature.
An ancillary issue in this debate over autonomy turns on an argument that presi-
dents are better equipped to manage and organize government structure, not whether
they have the constitutional or legal authority to do so. For instance, Lyndon B. Johnson’s
task force on government reorganization claimed that the president “alone has the
perspective to visualize the complex problems of Government organization, and to
appreciate how greatly the success of his policies depends on the soundness of the
administrative system by which they must be carried out” (Task Force 1964, 21).
Why does the president alone have such a perspective? There is little in U.S. history
to validate this exalted view of what presidents are capable of achieving. As Peri E.
Arnold notes in his book on the managerial presidency: the “plain fact is that no modern
president has fully managed the executive branch.” He observes that “the managerial
conception of the presidency is untenable.” Too many obligations and expectations have
been placed on the performance of presidents, he warns (Arnold 1986, 361-62). In
addition, modern presidents are in office at most eight years and many for just half that.
Members of Congress often have much longer careers in national government and have
more varied and rich perspectives for understanding the complexities of government.
There is little evidence to support the contention that presidents, rather than members
of Congress, somehow have greater perspective, knowledge, or ability to organize the
federal government.
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Conclusions
The framers established a democratic republic with structural protections. They did
not elevate political or policy expediency above democratic controls. Instead, they rejected
executive dominated government and believed that power should never be placed in
the hands of an unrestrained person, no matter how bright or seemingly incorruptible.
“Political idolatry of any stripe, including the divine right of kings or waiting for a Great
Man, found no support among the framers,” writes Louis Fisher. “They did not put their
faith in a single person. Fearing concentrated power, they believed in process and
structural checks” (Fisher 2010, 41-42). Congress, as the sole appropriator of federal
funds, has a constitutional obligation to hold presidents accountable. Avoiding such a
responsibility undermines the structural protections provided in the Constitution.
John Hart notes that “since the Executive Office of the President was established in
1939, Congress has shown a marked reluctance to enforce, let alone strengthen, its
oversight of the presidential branch” (1995, 186). Instead, a preference for comity over
vigorous checks has prevailed. But Hart warns that “comity, by definition, weakens the
potential of Congress to oversee the organization and functions of the presidential branch
in any effective way, and it would seem that if congressional oversight is to be strength-
ened, then comity must be weakened” (1995, 193). Hart is right. Presidents should
not be allowed unfettered discretion and unlimited legislative support in managing
the White House. For practical purposes, the White House became the focal point of
executive branch governance, which is ultimately where the controversy over czars began.
Certainly Congress acted carelessly in crafting the White House Authorization Act.
That law largely invited presidents to abuse the delegation of legislative power through
the use of czars. Lawmakers were perhaps acting in good faith and out of a sense of comity,
but now they must realize that good relations with the White House do not replace
necessary and needed checks on the use of government offices, resources, and money by
presidents. In the end, if public policy is not only being developed, but also implemented
by presidential staff, then Congress must provide greater oversight of the White House.
Thus, to strengthen accountability and to know where all federal workers are
serving at any given time, existing White House and EOP positions should be statutorily
limited in number. In addition, each position occupied by a presidential aide should be
named (that is, given an official title), duties described, and listed in Title 3 rather than
spread throughout the U.S. Code or not mentioned at all. Further, the president should
not be able to unilaterally create new positions and define their duties. Rather, a president
should seek congressional authorization when he wants to expand White House staff or
add new offices. The president also should not be able to transfer department staff to the
White House without congressional approval, or at a minimum he should be required to
report to Congress on who has been transferred and what duties they have performed.
Moreover annual reporting of the name, job title, job description, and salary of every
individual employed in the White House and the EOP should be required.
Since such reforms would be based on Congress’s constitutional authority to create,
modify, and even set limits on government structure, the president could not claim some
prerogative power to isolate himself from their effects. Constitutional checks on the
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presidency in the management of the federal government are not only allowed but
necessary. It is true that the modern age has ushered in a governing system where the
presidential staff has taken on greater responsibilities than have normally been carried out
by departments and agencies. Yet if Congress believes that such concentrated authority
in the White House is bad for a constitutional republic, then it has the power to make
the needed structural changes. The question is whether lawmakers have the will to act.
As Justice Robert Jackson explained in 1952: “We may say that power . . . belongs in the
hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its
fingers” (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 1952, 654).
In the case of Obama’s czars, Congress acted under its due constitutional authority
only to be undermined by executive fiat. But Obama’s action should not be the last word
on the matter, as lawmakers retains the right, and we would add even the duty, to
challenge such a blatant violation of Congress’s constitutional powers. One such attempt
after Obama’s action was a proposed Senate amendment to defund salaries for executive
branch czars. The measure failed on a 47 to 51 vote on June 23, 2011, but, like the earlier
House-led effort to defund czars, this surely will not be the last attempt by Congress to
eliminate executive branch czars (Ryan, 2011).
Members of Congress too often have been passive in the face of presidential power
grabs and have thus given cover to advocates of an unfettered executive power to make the
case that legislative inaction constituted consent. Instead of continuing their ambivalence
and abdicating responsibility, lawmakers should use the various constitutional based
powers at their disposal—from amending Title 3 to legislative, confirmation, oversight,
and investigation—to push back against the current practice of appointing executive
branch czars.
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